عنوان مقاله [English]
Nowadays, fair elections are impossible without controlling the flow of money in elections all around the world. To control money in the electoral process, there are three types of financing campaign systems, including public, private, and a hybrid system which are made up of various tools and mechanisms such as restrictions and prohibition of costs, restrictions and prohibitions on contribution, and transparency of financial transactions. Despite the fact that, like other countries, money as a negligible factor in the electoral process has caused election-related political scandals in Iran, no actions have taken place to amend laws to establish a campaign financing system so far. While financial-political scandals have been the driving force behind electoral reform in many countries, a look at Iran's electoral law reveals a tangible gap in this regard,. In this research, the authors attempt to provide a descriptive-analytical approach towards answering the research questions :a. what is the optimal pattern of financing electoral campaigns in Iran?, b. what are the features of this optimal model? The electoral campaign financing system operates within an environment that is closely linked to other circuits, meaning that the precondition for the establishment and success of this system requires changes in other relevant circuits including the rule of law as a key factor of good government, transparency of information, free access to information, independence and freedom of the media and civil societies, the existence of political parties and party activities, independent and specialized electoral law court and conflicts of interest which undoubtedly make it difficult to structure an optimal financing system. The general election policy is another obstacle in Iran, which, as an upstream document, leaves many of these efforts inefficient due to contradictions; certainly, the political will to change and electoral law reform are of the most important areas in the general system. In case of some changes in these areas, the favorable model of the Iranian financial system is a mixture of private and state aid reliance system because, in Iran, there is no private contribution and political party incomes through membership etc. In the current situation, political parties have little relevance to political activities in Iran in comparison to other countries. Therefore, the focus should be on individual candidates; and parties should be financed solely for current and routine activities such as staffing costs, etc., In addition, government assistance should not be allocated to their campaign activities in the condition of lack of criteria and effectiveness indicators. The focus of control tools in Iran should be on cost restriction and prohibition because firstly, costs are more controllable than aid. Secondly, cost constraint leads to lower costs. Thus, it reduces dependency on donors and the need for aid. Thirdly, Iranians are not acculturated with aid, especially small-aid. At the same time, large-scale and legal aid, which can lead to corruption and which are not usually provided without political and economic considerations, should be strictly regulated. For the financial exchanges to be clearly comprehensible, as a main regulatory tool, the public disclosure of financial transactions is essential. All of these regulatory tools are implemented by an independent, specialized supervisory body that can appeal its decisions to a higher authority.