تحلیل ماهیت پایشگری مؤسسه‌های گزارش‌دهی اعتبار، گزارشگران ‏ناهنجاری و بازرسان قانونی شرکت‌های تجاری در مقایسه با نهادهای مشابه ‏‏(بررسی تطبیقی در حقوق ایران و امریکا) ‏

مقالات آماده انتشار

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی

نویسنده

گروه حقوق خصوصی، گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدۀ حقوق، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران‏

چکیده

حاکمیت شرکتی، برای حمایت از صاحبان سرمایه، تأمین منافع و حفظ اعتماد آنها و نیز حصول اطمینان از عادلانه بودن، کارآمدی و شفافیت بازار سرمایه، در کنار الزامات مربوط به گزارشگری اطلاعات مالی، به یک ساختار نظارتی منسجم نیاز دارد تا با بررسی و صحت‌سنجی اطلاعات ارائه‌شده از سوی مدیران، کیفیت و درستی اطلاعاتی را که مبنای تصمیم‌گیری سرمایه‌گذاران قرار می‌گیرند، تضمین کند. یکی از مهم‌ترین کنترل‌کنندگان اطلاعات مالیِ مندرج در اسناد افشا، اشخاص حرفه‌ای و خارج از ساختار سازمانی شرکت‌های تحت نظارت هستند که به‌عنوان «پایشگران اطلاعات مالی» در بازار شناخته می‌شوند. مصادیق این پایشگران عبارت‌اند از: حسابرسان، مؤسسه‌های رتبه‌بندی اعتبار، متعهدان پذیره‌نویسی، شرکت‌های پردازش اطلاعات، وکلا و مشاوران حقوقی و نیز تحلیل‌گران اوراق بهادار. این فرض اولیه وجود دارد که دایرۀ مصادیق پایشگران بسته نیست و ممکن است حاکمیت شرکتی همراه با پویایی بازار، ایجاد محصولات مالی جدید و درنتیجه ضرورت صحت‌سنجی اطلاعات مربوط به آنها نهادهای دیگری را با کارکرد پایشگری در بازار خلق کند. بر اساس چنین فرضی، درخصوص ماهیت پایشگری مؤسسه‌های گزارش‌دهی اعتبار، گزارشگران ناهنجاری و نیز بازرسان قانونی ابهامات متعددی به ذهن متبادر می‌شود. نظر به اینکه نهاد پایشگری الزامات و تعهدات ویژه‌ای بر اشخاص تحت‌الشمول خود تحمیل‌ می‌کند، در این مقاله تلاش شده است با کمک مقایسۀ اشخاص پیش‌گفته با برخی از مصادیق مسلم پایشگری و تحلیل قوانین و مقررات مرتبط در هر دو حوزۀ حقوقی ایران و امریکا، به مهم‌ترین ابهامات مطرح‌شده در خصوص ماهیت پایشگری این فعالان بازارهای مالی پاسخ داده شود. یافته‌های تحلیل نشان می‌دهد که نخست، نمی‌توان هر نهادی را که در بازار به بررسی اطلاعات اشخاص متقاضی اعتبار اقدام کرده، تخلفات آنها را به بازار اعلام می‌نماید، مصداقی از پایشگران تلقی کرد. دوم، بر اساس فرض محدود نبودن دایرۀ مصادیق پایشگران و تنها به‌واسطۀ انجام وظایف مختلف در کنار کارکردهای پایشگری، نمی‌توان با به‌کاربردن الفاظ و عناوین متعدد، نهاد نظارتی جدیدی در چارچوب نظام کنترل گزارشگری شرکت‌های تجاری ایجاد کرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Analysis of the gatekeeping nature of credit reporting agencies, ‎whistleblowers, and inspectors of commercial companies compared to ‎similar institutions (A comparative study in Iranian and American law)‎

نویسنده [English]

  • Fatemeh Hamidian
Department of Private Law, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, Tarbiat Modares ‎University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

To protect capital owners, safeguard their interests, maintain their confidence, and ensure that the capital market is fair, efficient, and transparent, corporate governance, together with financial reporting requirements, requires a coherent regulatory structure that ensures the quality and accuracy of the information provided by managers through verifying and validating the information that forms the basis for investor decision-making. One of the most important controllers of financial information contained in the disclosure documents is professional persons outside the organizational structure of the controlled companies, known in the market as “gatekeepers.” Gatekeepers include auditors, credit rating agencies, underwriters, information processing companies, lawyers, legal advisors and securities analysts. There is a basic assumption that the category of gatekeepers is not limited to these entities, and it is possible that corporate governance, together with market dynamics, the creation of new financial products, and the resulting need to verify the information associated with them, will create other institutions with the function of gatekeeping in the market. Based on this assumption, many ambiguities arise regarding the gatekeeping role of credit reporting agencies, whistleblowers, and inspectors. Since gatekeeping imposes specific requirements and obligations on those subject to it, this article has attempted to answer the most important ambiguities raised about the gatekeeping nature of these financial market participants by comparing these entities with established gatekeepers and analyzing the relevant laws and regulations in the two legal systems of Iran and America. The results of the analysis show that first, any institution that investigates credit applicants' information and discloses their violations in the market cannot be considered a gatekeeper. Second, assuming that gatekeepers are not limited and perform various duties beyond monitoring functions, it is not possible to establish a new monitoring institution within the reporting control framework of commercial companies merely by introducing new terms and titles.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Inspectors
  • Gatekeepers
  • ‎Independent auditors
  • ‎Whistleblowers
  • Credit ‎reporting agencies.‎

مراجع

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مطالعات حقوق تطبیقی

مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده
انتشار آنلاین از تاریخ 01 تیر 1404

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