مطالعۀ تطبیقی انتقادی جدال هارت و فولر در باب پیوند قانون و اخلاق

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان

گروه فلسفۀ حقوق دانشگاه باقرالعلوم (ع)، قم، ایران‏

چکیده

جدال هارت و فولر در ادبیات فلسفۀ حقوق معاصر از جهات متعددی بسیار حائز اهمیت است. این جدال را می‌توان نقطۀ شروع بازاحیای سنت پوزیتیویسم حقوقی تلقی کرد که تلاش دارد هنجارهای اخلاقی را از ماهیت قانون تفکیک کند. این جدال طی دو مقاله و یک کتاب از هارت و یک مقاله و یک کتاب و یک ضمیمۀ کتاب از فولر شکل گرفته است. هرچند جدال این دو فیلسوف محدودۀ وسیعی از مسائل مبنایی فلسفۀ حقوق را دربر می‌گیرد و به قول برخی فیلسوفان، ملاک تمایز نظریات پوزیتیویستی از حقوق طبیعی شده است، اما همۀ این نزاع‌ها درحقیقت ناشی از اختلاف این دو بر سر ایدۀ تفکیک است. نگارندگان در این مقاله پس از بیان تاریخی مختصر از دیدگاه حقوق طبیعی و پوزیتیویسم حقوقی، سعی در بازسازی جدال این دو فیلسوف حقوق بر اساس منابع یادشده در چهار مسئلۀ 1- ماهیت حقوق، 2- تفسیر حقوقی، 3- پوزیتیویسم و فرا اخلاق و 4- محدوده و ماهیت دانش فلسفۀ حقوق، داشته‌‌اند. چنان‌که خواهیم دید در بعضی مسائل استدلال‌های هارت و در برخی، استدلال‌های فولر قانع‌کننده‌تر به‌نظر می‌آید؛ در برخی مسائل نیز استدلال هر دو به قدر کافی قانع‌کننده است و نزاع همچنان میان طرف‌داران این دو ادامه دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Critical and Comparative Study of Hart and Fuller's Debate on the ‎Relationship Between Law and Ethics

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ehsan Rafiealavy
  • Yusuf Khorrampanah
Department of Legal Philosophy, Baqir Al-Ulum University, Qom, Iran‎
چکیده [English]

The Hart-Fuller debate is of great importance in contemporary legal philosophy for several reasons. It can be considered the starting point for the revival of the tradition of legal positivism, which attempts to separate moral norms from the nature of law. The debate took place over two articles and a book by Hart, and an article, a book, and a book appendix by Fuller. Although the debate between these two philosophers covers a wide range of fundamental issues in legal philosophy, and has become, according to some philosophers, the criterion for distinguishing positivist theories from natural law theories, all these disputes are in fact due to the disagreement between the two over the idea of separation of law and moral norms. In this paper, after a brief historical account of the views of natural law and legal positivism, we have attempted to reconstruct the debate between these two legal philosophers based on the aforementioned sources, in four issues: 1- the nature of law, 2- legal interpretation, 3- positivism and meta-ethics, and 4- the scope and nature of the knowledge of legal philosophy. As we shall see, in some issues Hart's arguments seem more convincing, and in others Fuller's arguments, and in some issues both arguments are convincing enough, and the dispute continues between the proponents of the two.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Herbert Hart
  • Law and ‎Ethics
  • Legal Positivism
  • ‎Lon Fuller
  • Natural Law.‎

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مطالعات حقوق تطبیقی
دوره 16، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 31
بهار و تابستان 1404
تیر 1404
صفحه 221-239

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