مطالعات حقوق تطبیقی

مطالعات حقوق تطبیقی

استقلال، پیش‌فرض غیرقابل دفاع نظریۀ مسئولیت کیفری هوش ‌مصنوع

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
2 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق کیفری و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
نظریۀ مسئولیت کیفری مستقل برای هوش ‌مصنوعی به‌عنوان پارادایمی نوپدید در حقوق کیفری، نیازمند احراز استقلال این فناوری در ارتکاب جرم است؛ چراکه سامانه‌ای که فراتر از ابزاری در دست توسعه‌دهنده یا کاربر عمل نکند، صرفاً وسیلۀ ارتکاب آن محسوب می‌‌شود و مسئولیت آن متوجۀ عامل انسانی خواهد بود. در نوشتار حاضر به این پرسش پرداخته می‌شود که آیا هوش ‌مصنوعی اساساً واجد آن خصیصه‌ای است که پیش‌شرط فاعلیت حقوقی به‌شمار آید. به این ‌منظور با رویکردی توصیفی- تحلیلی و با بهره‌گیری از منابع کتابخانه‌ای، اعم از حقوقی و فنی، جنبه‌های گوناگون استقلال هوش ‌مصنوعی، ازجمله رفتار نوظهور و قابلیت توضیح، به‌مثابه مؤلفه‌های سنجش عاملیت مستقل بررسی شده است. تحلیل رویدادهای زیان‌بار و مجرمانۀ مرتبط با این سامانه‌ها نیز همچون آزمونی تجربی برای سنجش درجۀ استقلال بروزیافته، این نتیجه را تأیید می‌کند که هوش ‌مصنوعی کنونی، حتی در پیشرفته‌ترین اشکال خود و علی‌رغم برخورداری از قابلیت‌های یادگیری، انطباق‌پذیری و بروز رفتارهای بدیع، در چارچوب غایات ازپیش ‌تعیین‌شدۀ عاملان انسانی محصور می‌ماند و استقلال آن از سنخ «استقلال محدود و دگرآیین» است؛ استقلالی که هرچند چالش‌هایی برای نظام عدالت کیفری پدید می‌آورد، به آستانۀ «عاملیت مستقل» نمی‌رسد. بدین‌سان، تا زمانی که این آستانه محقق نشده است، فاعل انگاشتن هوش‌ مصنوعی به‌طور مستقل فاقد مبنا خواهد بود.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Autonomy: The Indefensible Assumption of Artificial Intelligence Criminal Liability Theory

نویسندگان English

Abbas Shiri 1
Mohammad Reza Barzegar 2
1 Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 PhD Student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

The theory of independent criminal liability for artificial intelligence, as an emerging paradigm in criminal law, requires establishing the autonomy of this technology in the commission of a crime, since a system that operates as no more than an instrument in the hands of its developer or user is regarded merely as a means of committing the offence, and liability will accordingly attach to the human agent. The present article addresses the antecedent question of whether artificial intelligence fundamentally possesses the attribute that constitutes the precondition of legal agency. To this end, adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing upon library-based sources of both a legal and a technical nature, the various dimensions of AI autonomy, including emergent behaviour and explainability, are examined as criteria for assessing independent agency. The analysis of criminal incidents associated with such systems, undertaken as an empirical test for gauging the degree of autonomy actually manifested, likewise confirms the conclusion that contemporary artificial intelligence, even in its most advanced forms and notwithstanding its capacities for learning, adaptability, and the emergence of novel behaviours, remains confined within the framework of ends predetermined by human agents, and that its autonomy is best characterised as a "limited and heteronomous autonomy"; an autonomy which, although it poses challenges for the criminal justice system, falls short of the threshold of "independent agency", namely the fundamental precondition for artificial intelligence to qualify as a proper addressee of any model of liability. Accordingly, so long as this threshold remains unattained, treating artificial intelligence as an independent perpetrator will be devoid of any legal foundation.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Artificial Intelligence
Autonomy
Agency
Criminal Liability.
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