نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
2 استادیار حقوق عمومی، دانشکدۀ حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
3 دانشیار حقوق عمومی، دانشکدۀ حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
عنوان مقاله [English]
Civil liability of the state in the matter of legislation, contrary to the executive and judicial acts, is still supposed to be far-fetched; while general legislative decisions might be faulty or mistaken and violate the principle of full compensation of citizens' damages. This article seeks to consider the theories and conditions upon which the liability of legislative bodies to compensate for harmful general decisions is admissible. Based on our findings, risk theory against fault theory could provide more legal protections in the civil liability of the lawmaker. According to the principle of equality to carry public burdens, we can defend the state's absolute liability, which is more efficient to access restorative justice and more compatible with the requirements of good governance. Civil liability does not necessarily indicate the illegality and invalidity of decisions; however, the illegality of decisions definitely proves the fault of public bodies. Implications of civil liability in the legislative and quasi-legislative acts include promoting self-control, preventing statutory inflation, and reducing unnecessary intervention of the state.