Jon Elster's Theory of Rational Choice and Codifying of the ‎Constitution‏ ‏with a Comparative Approach to the Constitution of Iran

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University of ‎Tehran, Tehran, Iran‎

2 Department of Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Mazandaran University, Babolsar, Iran.

3 Department of Public Law‏, ‏Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University of ‎Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In this article, it is claimed that in modern law, the drafting of the constitution is one of the most important and sensitive measures in forming the legal order. Because the legal system determines the general framework of individual actions and social interaction of people, and this is both for the present and future and of course, the form of this law is also a matter of choice. In line with justifying this claim, John Elster's theory of rational choice is one of the most influential and comprehensive theories in explaining and criticizing the methods of drafting the constitution, which is based on two principles: the first principle: "the individuality of human action" and the second principle " The benefit-centeredness of human actions" has been proposed. According to this opinion, the electoral behavior of a society is the best example of using a rational choice, and the formulation and construction of the constitution is the best case, because in this work, even if there is no malice, it may make the situation worse than it is, and this is due to "rationality". is incomplete. This essay has investigated the application of this method in the analysis of drafting and revising the basic law, or what is called the design of the constitution, with an emphasis on the thought of John Elster. The purpose of the research is to examine this theory in relation to how and why people participate in drafting and creating the constitution as rational agents. This is a Research Article

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

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Comparative Law Review
Volume 15, Issue 2
Autumn & Winter 2024-2025
December 2024
Pages 473-495

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