Right of Access to the Airport: The Rules of Airport Slot Allocation

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant professor of faculty of law and political science, University of Tehran, Tehran,Iran.

Abstract

The growth of airlines and competition, has raised new challenges for the exploitation of airport land infrastructure, out of which, the slot allocation in hub or dense airports is the most important one. The history of airports in the world has seen many rules in this regard, so that while in the beginning, “first-come, first-serve rule” used to be applied in many airports, the growth in demands made the regulators to devise new rules for slot allocation. Sometimes, committees comprised of the airlines were in charge of such delicate issue, but the rising anti-competitive practices and deadlock in agreements led the governments to step in and regulate the slot allocation based on various rules including “grandfather right rule”, “use it or lose it rule”, “buy-sell rule”, “lottery”, etc. Such rules which are followed by slot mobility and the possibility of taking it as collateral are dealt with in this article with emphasis on the economic and legal points of view and with a comparative study of EU, USA and Iranian law.

Keywords

References

  1. - Books:

    1. Boyfield, Keith (2003). “Who Owns Airport Slots? A Market Solution to a Deepening Dilemma” in Keith Boyfield, David Starkie, Tom Bass, Davis Humphreys, Markets in Airport Slots (IEA).
    2. Doganis, Rigas (1992). the Airport Business, Routledge, New York.
    3. Gillen, David, Czerny, Achim I., Forsyth, Peter, and HansMarin Niemeier (eds) (2008). Airport Slots. International Experiences and Options for Reform, G.E.R.S, London.
    4. Moessner, Philipp (2005). Slot Allocation in the United States and Europe, thesis submitted to Mc Gill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Laws.
    5. Sorensen, Frederik (2016). “the Slot Allocation Philosophy at the EU”, in Czerny, Achim I. et al, Airport Slots: International Experiences and Options for Reform, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York.

     

    - Articles

    1. Dempsey, Paul Stephan (2001). “Airport Landing Slots: Barriers to Entry and Impediments to Competition”, Annual of Air and Space Law, Vol.26, issue. 1.
    2. Kociubinski, Jakub (2014). “Regulatory Challenges of Airport Slot Allocation in the European Union”, Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics.
    3. Hardaway, Robert (1986). “FAA Buy-Sell Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the Crossroads”, 52 Journal of Air Law & Commerce 1.
    4. Gleimer, Eileen M. (1996). “Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going”, Vol. 61 Journal of Air Law & Commerce 877.
    5. Maffeo, Dario (2001). “Slot Trading in the Reform of the Council Regulation (EEC) NO. 95/93: A Comparative Analysis with the United States”, 66 Journal of Air Law & Commerce.
    6. Leon, Pablo Mendes de. (2013). “A Multifunctional Approach towards Slot Allocation”. Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht - German Journal of Air and Space Law, vol. 62, no. 4, January, p. 553-578.
    7. Lerner, Stephen D. (1996). “Airside Commercialization through Slot Allocation”, Annals of Air and Space Law 21, 209-234.
    8. Pagliari, R. (2001). “Selling Grandfather: An Analysis of the Latest EU Proposals on Slot Trading”, Air and Space Europe, 3.
    9. Seretis, Marios (2015). “Restrictions on Airport Access through Slot Controls in Europe and the United States: Too Much but Too Bad, or Just Good Enough but Not for Everyone”, Annals of Air and Space Law 40, 903-918.
Comparative Law Review
Volume 13, Issue 1
Spring & Summer 2022
June 2022
Pages 23-42

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics